This paper addresses the application of fault trees to the analysis of robot manipulator reliability and fault tolerance. Although a common and useful tool in other applications, fault trees have only recently been applied to robots. In addition, most of the fault tree analyses in robotics have focused on qualitative, rather than quantitative, analysis. Robotic manipulators present some special problems, due to the complex and strongly coupled nature of their subsystems, and also their wild response to subsystem failures. Additiondy, there is a lack of reliability data for robots and their subsystems. There has traditionally been little emphasis on fault tolerance in the design of industrial robots, and data regarding operational robot failures is relatively scarce.
INTRODUCTION
In spite of the fact that robotics has been a rapidly developing area in the last few years, there has been relatively little work in robot reliability and fault tolerance until recently [15]. Robot manipulators are a critical mix of mechanical, electrical, and electronic components. Consequently, there are numerous critical failure modes inherent in a typical manipulator system. The situation is compounded by the fact that robot systems are highly dynamic, resulting in very rapid and wild responses of robots to subsystem failures. Due to the dynamic and nonlinear nature of robots, much reliability analysis is necessarily complex and often both configuration and trajectory dependent.
Robots are being increasingly deployed in remote and hazardous environments, which make reliability and fault tolerance of even more critical importance than previously. Some key research in robot reliability is already under way [8, 11, 151. This paper discusses the particular concerns involved in the synthesis and analysis of fault trees for robotics applications. Fault trees have only recently been applied to robots [5, 7, 141, where much of the work has been for qualitative analysis [15]. Our work is focused on remote manipulators for remediation of highly radioactive waste. This application presents special problems, as discussed in the following section.
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Robotic arms will be deployed t o assist in remediation of the waste tanks at the Hanford, Washington, Nuclear Site. At Hanford, about 140, OOOm3 of high-level radioactive waste is being stored in 149 single-shell tanks (SSTs) [lo] . This waste has been produced at Hanford since the 1940's as a by-product of processing spent nuclear fuel for uranium and plutonium recovery.
The U S . Department of Energy (DOE) has established a program to remove, treat, and dispose of the wastes stored in these underground tanks. The goal is t o 'develop and field retrieval systems with the capability to remove wastes from these tanks and transfer those wastes for further downstream processing' [lo] . Long reach manipulators are the technology selected by DOE to remove the waste from the tanks.
In earlier work [17] , we have developed fault trees to support the design of an underground storage tank manipulator for Environmental Restoration and Waste Management [a] . The robot is t o be deployed in single-shell underground storage tanks at the DOE site in Hanford, Washington. The manipulator is to be lowered into the tank from above, and is required t o move within the tank and remove or remediate waste in the tank as shown in Fig. 1 . The proposed robot will be required to maneuver around various pipes and debris within the underground storage tank. The waste removal end effector will need t o be carefully positioned above the waste t o quickly and effectively remove as much waste as possible. The robot will be kinematically redundant (have more than six joints) so that the manipulator will have sufficient dexterity to avoid obstacles.
Reliability and fault tolerance are clearly of prime importance in this application. The manipulator must "fail safe" within the tank, to prevent possible spillage of the waste into the environment.
In addition, in the event of a failure in the robot system, the arm must be removable from the tank. These requirements impose significant design restrictions on the arm. Reliability is a key issue in the design phase, and our work in fault tree analysis is in support of the early design phase for the manipulator. Our fault trees include failure modes from the mechanical, sensor, and computer control subsystems as well as the human operator [17] .
A standard qualitative analysis of the fault trees was useful, and resulted in a series of recommended changes t o the original manipulator design [17] . It is to be expected that a quantitative analysis will provide significant further insights. However, quantitative reliability analyses of the fault trees is more problematic in the robotics application, due in part to uncertain data and repeated events in the trees. The following sections discuss these issues in more detail.
FAULT TREE ANALYSIS FOR ROBOTS
In this section, for the purpose of illustration, we first discuss a two-joint planar robot, with one position sensor and actuator at each joint. This robot represents a two joint subset of the original design for the waste retrieval arm considered in [17] , and will be used here for demonstration purposes. A fault tree for a general manipulator would of course be much more detailed, but this basic example will serve t o demonstrate many of the key issues in robot fault tree analysis. From a reliability point of view, the robot represented by Figure 2 is the least favorable design, since two joints are the minimum possible for arbitrary positioning in a planar workspace, and a failure in either sensor or actuator will typically lead t o a wild failure response [15] . With only a single sensor or actuator per joint, the control algorithm is vulnerable to errors and may incorrectly move the robot arm if a failure occurs. This basic robot failure scenario will be studied in the fault trees in this paper. Figure 2 shows a fault tree for the two joint robot in the plane where M 1 refers to the actuator (motor) on joint one, J 1. There is only a single sensor S 1 at this joint. The second joint is similarly labeled. The trees have been evaluated using the FaultrEASE software package [ 191.
From Figure 2 , it can be observed that the failure of any motor or sensor will lead t o robot failure. In order to improve the fault tolerance of the robot system, a glance at the fault tree reveals several modifications that can be made to the robot. Perhaps, the simplest improvement is to add a redundant sensor at each joint. This is indicated by the AND gate with sensors S 1A and S 1B at J 1 in motors. It is assumed that it will be possible to lock the failed joint and that the robot planning task can be modified to compensate for the reconfiguration. Therefore, two of the three joints shown in the fault tree in Figure 3 must fail before there is robot operational (top event) failure. The fault tree has been drawn explicitly to show the pairings of the robot joints. There are 12 cutsets in this fault tree. For example, the primary events M 1, S 2A, and S 2B form a cutset. The various sensors and motors now appear as repeated events within the fault tree. This tree structure and modification is typical of the type of results obtained in qualitative analysis of more detailed robot fault trees [17] . In the following section, quantitative aspects of the analysis of these trees will be presented to illustrate the issues and difficulties inherent in the case of the more detailed robot fault trees.
, QUANTITATIVE ISSUES
For some robot subsystems, standard techniques
[13] can be used to analyze their reliability through fault trees. However, a key difficulty for quantitative reliability analysis of robots is that reliability data for important subsystems and components is not well established or trusted. This is particularly true for robots to be deployed in hazardous and radioactive environments [15] . In many cases, reliability data for robot components in these environments is at best approximately known. Thus, in order to quantitatively analyze the overall fault trees, some type of approximate analysis, which combines conventional reliability analyses for well understood subsystems with reliability estimates for less well understood subsystems, is required.
One useful type of approximate analysis is based on the technique of interval analysis [6] where ranges of numbers are systematically combined. Range failure information is an attractive option in the case of uncertain data, and may be readily derived from existing data. For example, failure rate data for nonradioactive environments [l] can be expanded into a failure rate interval to study the reliability of robots used in hazardous radioactive environments. This ap- proach, which allows for "approximate", or "fuzzy)) failure probabilities, is strongly related to fuzzy logic techniques [4, 12, 181 for dealing with uncertainty in the data. We will next use the fault trees from the previous section to outline one such approach, which is based on manipulating (based on subsystem reliability estimates and the structure of the fault trees) approximate ranges of subsystem reliabilities. Table 1 shows reliability interval data that is derived from the 1995 Nonelectronic Parts Reliability Data (NPRD-95) failure rate tables [I]. It was observed in NPRD-95 that 68 percent of failure rates will be between 0.22 and 4.5 times the reported value. Furthermore, 90 percent of failure rates were between 0.8 and 11.9 times the reported value. The total m i ssion operation time for the robot to operate in a single underground storage tank would be on the order of 1,000 hours. The robot would then be carefully decontaminated and removed from the tank. Maintenance would be performed and then the robot would be moved to the next tank at the Hanford site to continue waste removal. In this case, an approximate probability of failure E131 was determined as At, where t = 1000 hours. Since the robot will be used in a hazardous radiation environment which is beyond the scope of NPRD-95, the failure probability was expanded over an interval. The given failure probability p is expanded into an inner interval Epl,p,] such that p~ = 0 . 8~ and pT = 4 . 5~ and an outer interval bll,pTT] such that pn = 0 . 2 2~ and pTT = 1 1 . 9~. The four point interval based on the NPRD-95 ranges is shown in Figure 4 . Using these estimates, Table 1 shows the interval data to be used in the fault tree analysis. For the electric motor the base failure probability from NPRD-95 is p = 0.00924 and for the optical encoder sensor the failure probability is p = 0.0155.
For the basic two joint robot described in Figure 2 , the following probabilities shown in Figure 4 : Failure probability interval. were calculated for the top event. These inner and outer component failure probability intervals are numerically propagated through the fault tree to produce intervals for the top level failure event. This approach is similar to the fuzzy analysis in [la] . The exact probability of failure is p = 0.0490 in this case.
A similar quantitative analysis can be performed for the three joint redundant planar robot shown in Figure 3 . This configuration shows a reduction in failure probability due to the additional sensors and joint. The exact probability of failure of the top event is p = 0.000268.
The robot fault tree discussed above for the fault tolerant robot displays repeated events at the sensor level, leading to added complexity in a quantitative analysis [9] . From this analysis, the probability of robot operational failure has been reduced from p = 0.0490 to p = 0.000268. This represents an improvement of approximately a factor of 200 for the redundant fault tolerant design for the mission time of 1,000 hours. It is also interesting to note that the worst case outer failure probability interval point for the three joint redundant robot, prr = 0.0534 fits within the inner failure probability interval, [p[,pr] = [0.0109,0.223] for the basic nonfault tolerant two joint planar robot design. This data shows that the additional complexity in adding redundant sensors and joints yields tangible reliability improvements. The quantitative analysis backs up the intuitive qualitative analysis surrounding the initial discussion of the fault trees. With multiple sensors present, it becomes important to have efficient fault detection algorithms to make use of this redundancy.
APPLICABILITY AND FUTURE WORK
The potential for successful application of fault trees in robotics extends well beyond the design phase discussed in this paper. One proposed approach for the use of fault trees as a framework for real-time robot fault tolerance software is discussed in [14]. A critical issue here is that of including fault detection and coverage in the analysis. The timescale for the occurrence of robot faults is typically on the order of many hours, where undetected and/or uncovered fablts typically critically affect the system in the order of milliseconds. Thus techniques which combine the concise representation of fault trees with efficient coverage models will be important in the future.
The approach suggested in [3] , which decomposes fault occurrence and fault recovery into two separate submodels, appears to be have significant potential for robotics. The approach, which combines fault tree and coverage models efficiently, could be directly applicable for those subsystems of the robot (control computer, etc. ) whose coverage models can be consistently defined independent of the robot configuration or task.
One critical complication with robot manipulators is that other fault detection models, for example for those subsystems in motion within the arm (sensors, actuators, etc) will be configuration-dependent, i.e. vary with each manipulator motion trajectory. This means that coverage models must be augmented with trajectory dependent information. For example, consider fault detection for a robot wrist joint position sensor. For the manipulator performing a "pick and place" task, it is mostly the shoulder and elbow (proximal) joints that are used for gross positioning. In this case, the wrist (distal) joints are moved very 1996 PROCEEDINGS Annual RELIABILITY and MAINTAINABILITY Symposium sparingly, if at all. Thus, the wrist sensor readings are largely isolated from effects from the remainder of the arm, and spurious wrist sensor readings (perhaps from a terminal sensor fault) will be relatively easy to distinguish and isolate. However, in the case of rapid fine motions (largely involving the wrist joints), dynamic coupling between the wrist joints can introduce significant errors in the controller, which enter the sensor readings as extra noise [16] . In this case fault detection becomes a much more complex problem [16], the coverage model takes a different form, and probabilities are significantly altered. This simple example motivates the need for more dynamic coverage models than are in operation at the present time. Most fault detection methods currently employed in robots are quite ad hoc, and are based on comparing sensor readings with expected other sensed values, and masking normal sensor errors with fixed thresholds. These thresholds are determined empirically for specific trajectories. The imprecision in this approach has led to both false alarms and missed faults [15] . Algorithms for robot fault detection which theoretically guarantee complete detection and coverage for robot arms under certain assumptions have been established and analyzed recently [16] . However, much more work needs to be done in the area of robot coverage models in order to draw general conclusions regarding robot fault coverage.
In conclusion, we have found that fault trees are an excellent technique for analyzing reliability and fault tolerance in a multidisciplinary area such as robotics. Qualitative fault tree analyses have proved valuable for various robotic applications [5, 7, 15,171. Quantitative analyses for robotics are more problematic due to the limited data on these custom systems. However, such estimates are important in the manipulator design process, and the techniques discussed in this paper offer a systematic technique for quantitative analysis of reliability and fault tolerance for robots.
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